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INTRODUCTION 
Legal interpretation is an increasingly prominent feature of 
national governance in Latin America. This development is certainly 
evident with respect to high profile judicial decisions. It has also 
become a major topic of legal academic debate. There are a number 
of reasons this is so. Beginning in the mid-1980s, many countries 
adopted new constitutions or constitutional reforms with 
significantly expanded fundamental rights and basic guarantees. 
Some of these new or amended charters introduced separate 
constitutional tribunals, greater constitutional review in existing 
courts, and additional procedures for constitutional claims. 
Additionally, many countries established judicial councils to make 
the judiciary more independent and to sanction official misconduct. 
As a result, increased public discussion of judicial action is driven at 
least in part by these material changes.  
During roughly the same time period, graduate legal studies in the 
United States have become increasingly popular, not only for Latin 
American business lawyers and political leaders, but also for scholars 
and academics. In the past, the latter usually headed to continental 
Europe for advanced degrees. Now increasing exposure to Anglo-
American legal culture has resulted in a greater focus on adjudication 
and its related set of concerns, among which legal interpretation is 
central. Additionally, beginning in the late 1980’s, the second wave 
of legal development assistance from the United States and 
international sources has significantly focused on modernizing the 
judiciary, transferring not only technical expertise, but also judicial 
ideology and culture.  
Finally, some Latin American law schools have begun hiring 
larger numbers of full-time faculty members, a significant change 
from the previously near-exclusive reliance on practicing lawyers. 
Some schools are substantially investing in junior faculty by 
providing incentives for graduate studies and research stays abroad. 
Some of these schools have created masters and doctoral programs, a 
relatively new development, for locals not willing or able to leave 
home. Many of these institutions are looking to their faculty 
members returning from foreign studies or graduate programs to lead 
these new offerings.  
This expanded pool of local scholars, graduate students abroad, 
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diasporic Latin American academics, and engaged Latin 
Americanists constitutes a significant and growing discursive 
community. Its members intervene not only in comparative law 
fields in the global North, but also in legal-political debates within 
individual Latin American countries. As a result, the surging interest 
in legal interpretation is not solely attributable to the wave of recent 
constitutional and legal reform, it is also the product of a growing 
critical mass of engaged participants, a newly shared stock of Anglo-
American legal literature, and certainly the expectation that public 
debate and academic interventions can produce tangible effects.  
 Clearly, specific exchanges over questions of legal reasoning vary 
from country to country, especially given the diversity of actual 
issues at stake, the multitude of theories or approaches in play, and 
the sometimes unexpected political alignments of transnational 
sources and local politics. Common to much of the region, however, 
is the “turn to legal interpretation” and the field of discourse it 
designates, marking a shift away from traditional legal reasoning and 
its accepted methods. Whether debating nuevo derecho in Colombia, 
principiologia in Brazil,1 the proportionality principle in Mexico,2 or 
plurinational legal hermeneutics in Bolivia,3 the background 
framework for these discussions is much the same: new interpretive 
theories are marshaled against the conventional practices of national 
courts and traditional commentators, which are in turn dismissed as 
pure legal formalism.4  
 
 1. See Leonardo García Jaramillo, El “Nuevo Derecho” En Colombia: 
¿Entelequia Innecesaria O Novedad Pertinente? [The “New Law” in Colombia: 
Unnecessary Entelechy or Pertinent Novelty?], 29 BARRANQUILLA 289, 292 
(2008) (Colom.) (noting that “nuevo derecho” refers to a series of theoretical and 
dogmatic transplants); Padua Fernandes, A reflexão sobre os princípios no direito 
[Reflection on the Principles of Law], 6 PRISMA JURÍDICO 11, 11-14 (2007) (Braz.) 
(identifying the similar role that general, judicial, and moral principles share as 
sources of law). 
2. Imer Flores, Towards a Glocal Jurisprudence: Comparative – and 
Transnational – Constitutional Reformation and Interpretation in Mexico (2010) 
(presented at the XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy for 
Comparative Law, Washington, D.C., July 2010) (on file with American 
University International Law Review).  
3. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, REFUNDACIÓN DEL ESTADO 
EN AMÉRICA LATINA: PERSPECTIVAS DESDE UNA EPISTEMOLOGÍA DEL SUR 
[REFOUNDATION OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM A 
SOUTHERN EPISTEMOLOGY] (2010). 
 4. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE 
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The present Essay begins to explore this background dichotomy of 
the current legal interpretation debates. At first glance, Latin 
American “interpretationists” seem merely to be echoing the legal 
realists in their opposition to formalist legal thought. Upon further 
inspection, however, it becomes clear that, by taking as their foil an 
aberrational Latin American legal formalism, interpretationists are 
simply reproducing the common diagnosis of pervasive legal failure 
within the region. This Essay argues that, in doing so, the new 
interpretation may yield some significantly self-defeating and 
unintended effects. Admittedly, the many examples and case studies 
the topic fully merits are not possible in this short piece. To begin 
this discussion, nonetheless, Part I briefly identifies the salient 
features of the new interpretation. Part II summarizes the sources of 
the failed law background against which it is conducted, drawing on 
some of my earlier work. Finally, Part III indicates various 
drawbacks of the new interpretation, highlighting its dependence on 
the failed law concept. 
I. THE NEW INTERPRETATION 
The “new interpretation,” as defined here, is not limited to any one 
mode whether historical, constructivist, sociological, or 
hermeneutic.5 It is also not confined to a single area, such as 
interpreting constitutions, codes, or other legal texts, although 
 
SIÈCLE 105-07 (1997). 
 5. My intention is not in any way to emphasize so-called “interpretive” 
approaches at the expense of others in my discussion of interpretationism, since 
they are only some of the many new theories. On interpretivism, see Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Interpretive Liberalism, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 276, 276-
77 (1991) (exploring political theory through the interpretation of political culture 
and noting that a new liberal political theory arose out of the lack of “legitimacy of 
the liberal state”); on hermeneutics, see NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 30 (2d 
ed. 2008) (explaining Hart’s hermeneutic way of analyzing legal jurisprudence 
through the lens of moral and political philosophy); on a sociological approach, see 
Mauricio García Villegas, No Sólo De Mercado Vive La Democracia: El fenómeno 
del (in)cumplimiento del derecho y su relación con el desarrollo, la Justicia y la 
democracia [Democracy Does Not Survive Solely on the Market: The Phenomenon 
of (Non)Compliance with Rights and Its Relation to Development, Justice, and 
Democracy], 6 REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA INSTITUCIONAL 95, 95-134 (2004) 
(Colom.). See generally CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 22-25 (1996) (discussing how interpretation is 
necessary to fill logical gaps in constitutional law, such as how the right to life in 
the Argentine Constitution is inferred from other clauses). 
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constitutional questions are clearly the most prominent.6 Overall, the 
new interpretation presents additional elements for legal reasoning, 
such as the application of neutral principles; the utilization of past 
facts of a legal, social, or historical nature; and the introduction of 
consequentialist thinking. Thus, the reference here to new 
interpretation or interpretationism does not denote any single 
perspective. Instead, it is meant to capture the wide array of 
discussions across the region about national governance through 
interpreting law and legal texts.7 It signals a newer, heightened 
consciousness about legal reasoning.  
A. FROM APPLICATION TO INTERPRETATION  
Historically, national legal communities in Latin American states 
have constructed their local legal discourse in deeply transnational 
ways.8 The common observation that Latin America is part of the 
civil law tradition, or a member of the Romano-Germanic or 
continental European legal family, is primarily an outward sign of 
the embeddedness of this transnationalism within the region’s 
national legal systems.9 The paradigm of European transnationalism 
can be analyzed in its different historical moments and from its 
different theoretical underpinnings, such as natural law, positivism, 
 
6. See generally Dante Figueroa, Current Constitutional Developments in 
Latin America, INT’L LEGAL RESEARCH INFORMER (ASIL) 8-18 (Summer 2011), 
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/IG/Informer_Summer_2011.pdf. 
 7. I use the terms “new interpretation” and “interpretationism” 
interchangeably to refer to this academic and expert discourse about legal 
reasoning in, or related to, Latin America. 
 8. See generally Alejandro M. Garro, Shaping the Content of a Basic Course 
on Latin American Legal Systems, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 595, 599 
(1988) (signaling the influence of French, Spanish, German, and Italian law in 
Latin America). 
 9. See generally PHANOR J. EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW 4 (1950) (describing the history of civil 
law systems by illustrating how the Roman law influenced Latin American law by 
its reliance on statutes and the legislature); RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, 
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 81-82 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining how the Romano-
Germanic source of civil law expanded to the “western world”); JOHN HENRY 
MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ–PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 42 (3d 
ed. 2007) (examining how interpretation within the judicial system in civil law 
countries is criticized as an abuse of discretion by the courts). 
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and legal sociology.10 In sum, its effect is to generate legal analysis 
and legal scholarship which, in their most reputable forms, are 
commonly performed by citing and commenting upon prominent 
continental European authorities. Local legal-political positions are, 
as such, expressed in this particular language of foreign and 
comparative sources.  
To date, a few jurisprudential studies have been produced about 
the workings of this traditional mode of legal reasoning and 
argument in Latin America.11 Significantly, the most important 
results of this work show that it is not merely copying or unthinking 
and random uses of foreign texts. Still, the practice may indeed lead 
to some unintended consequences because of the quite indirect ways 
that local policy objectives are expressed.12 At its most basic level, 
this European-inflected transnationalism offers a mode of taking 
positions on local questions of law without appearing to be engaged 
in mere politics. It provides arguments and models for legislative 
reform and institutional change, and it legitimizes action and 
discretion by local legal officials. Law, seen in this way, is thus not 
simply the winning side of local political struggle or conflicting 
beliefs. Rather, it can be portrayed as more broadly transnational, if 
not plausibly universal.  
Regarding judicial decision-making, John Merryman and Rogelio 
Pérez-Perdomo have noted the great anxiety it produces: 
This evolution [of courts’ acceptance of the power of interpretation] has 
also been accompanied by an enormous amount of discussion and writing, 
some of it to justify interpretation of statutes by courts, some of it to 
 
 10. See Josef L. Kunz, Introduction to LUIS RECASÉNS SICHES ET AL., LATIN-
AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY xix (Gordon Ireland et al. trans., 1948) (placing 
jurisprudential theories in historical context, contending that natural law was 
predominant in eighteenth century France, positivism in nineteenth century 
continental Europe, and sociological jurisprudence in early twentieth century Latin 
America); see also Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 425, 441 (1997). 
 11. See Garro, supra note 8, at 602 (explaining how few scholars, other than 
those in political science, economics, or sociology, are willing to research Latin 
American institutions because these institutions are seen as “underdeveloped and 
backward”). 
 12. See generally DIEGO EDUARDO LÓPEZ MEDINA, TEORÍA IMPURA DEL 
DERECHO: LA TRANSFORMACIÓN DE LA CULTURA JURÍDICA LATINOAMERICANA 
[THE IMPURE THEORY OF LAW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
JURIDICAL CULTURE] (2004). 
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define the limits of the interpretive power, and some of it to specify how 
that power should be exercised. The mass of scholarship on interpretation 
in civil law countries (which is roughly analogous to the mass of literature 
in the United States on judicial process) thus is in part an expression of 
uneasiness over the fact that courts are interpreting statutes, and in part an 
expression of anxiety that they will abuse their power of interpretation; 
only a small proportion of it focuses on the actual process of 
interpretation . . . . Only a few writers have tried to give the judge help in 
facing up to particular problems of interpretation.13  
The new interpretation addresses this “actual process” directly. It 
takes the leap from discussions about applying the law—the 
traditional mantra in civil law systems—to debates about outright 
interpreting it. Accordingly, it brings legal reasoning practices into 
sharp relief.14 Methods and theories for correct and singular legal 
 
 13. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 42. 
 14. See, e.g., Everaldo Lamprea M., Derechos Fundamentales y Consecuencias 
Económicas [Fundamental Rights and Economic Consequences], 8 REVISTA DE 
ECONOMÍA INSTITUCIONAL 77, 84 (2006) (Colom.) (claiming that independent 
theories that conceive rights as procedural criteria or restrictions which are to be 
observed above all other considerations are incomplete); Valéria Ribas do 
Nascimento, A Filosofia Hermenêutica Para Uma Jurisdição Constitucional 
Democrática: Fundamentação/Aplicação Da Norma Jurídica Na 
Contemporaneidade [The Hermeneutic Philosophy for a Democratic 
Constitutional Jurisdiction: Substantiation/Application of the Rule of Law in 
Modernity], 5 REVISTA DIREITO GV 147, 147-168 (2009) (Braz.) (recognizing the 
valorization of constitutional jurisdiction as a contributing source to the 
development of theories for judicial interpretation); see also Víctor Alberto 
Quinche Ramírez, Los sistemas jurídicos y la teoría del razonamiento judicial: una 
lectura de H.L.A. Hart [Juridical Systems and the Theory of Judicial Reasoning: A 
Lecture of H.L.A. Hart], 5 REVISTA ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURIDICOS [ESTUD. SOCIO-
JURID.] 257, 257 (2003) (Colom.) (contrasting Hart’s concept of rights with 
Dworkin’s interpretation of norms); Sergio Estrada Vélez & Julián García 
Ramírez, Algunas reflexiones en torno a la necesidad de una teoría del derecho y 
de los casos difíciles acorde al contexto del Estado constitucional colombiano 
[Some Reflections Surrounding the Necessity of a Theory of Rights and of Hard 
Cases According to the Context of the Constitutional State of Colombia], 8 
OPINIÓN JURÍDICA 97, 98 (2009) (Colom.) (exploring the social and constitutional 
rule of law model and the obstacles it faced in the Colombian context); Pilar 
Zambrano, El Derecho como práctica y como discurso: la perspectiva de la 
persona como garantía de objetividad y razonabilidad en la interpretación [Law 
as a Practice and Discourse: The Perspective of Personhood as a Guarantee of 
Objectivity and Reasonableness in Interpretation], 23 DÍKAION 109, 111 (2009) 
(Colom.) (arguing that although “the teleological projection of law” creates 
problems in legal interpretation “it also constitutes the limit or framework for the 
creative dimension of interpretation”). 
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outcomes are its central focus. In the new interpretation, prestigious, 
transnational theories, especially from the United States and the 
United Kingdom, are its primary sources.15  
B. SUPPORTING NEO-CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The impetus for legal interpretation is quite intelligible. It 
accompanies a recent trend in Latin America of progressive 
constitutional decisions and reformist legal constructions, part of the 
broader global trend of neo-constitutionalism.16 Of course, a turn to 
 
 15. See, e.g., Margarita Cepeda, Dworkin: un mal lector [Dworkin: A Bad 
Reader], 6 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES 123, 124 (2000) (Colom.); Daniela R. 
Ikawa, Hart, Dworkin e Discricionariedade [Hart, Dworkin and Discretion], 6 
LUA NOVA: REVISTA DE CULTURA E POLÍTICA 97, 97-113 (2006) (Braz.) 
(distinguishing between H. L. A. Hart’s positivist theory and Ronald Dworkin’s 
constructivist theory in their application to the question of judicial discretion in 
cases of legal lacunae); Luis Villavicencio Miranda, Algunas Críticas a la Idea de 
Razón Pública Rawlsiana [Some Critiques of the Idea of Rawlsianan Public 
Reasoning], 23 REVISTA DE DERECHO 533, 533-57 (2009) (Chile); Victor Manuel 
Rojas Amandi, El Concepto De Derecho De Ronald Dworkin [The Concept of 
Rights According to Ronald Dworkin], 246 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE 
DERECHO, UNAM 355, 355-56 (2006) (noting that Dworkin’s theory was 
developed through judicial analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court); Javier Saldaña, 
¿Derechos Morales O Derechos Naturales? Un Análisis Conceptual desde la 
Teoría Jurídica de Ronald Dworkin [Moral Rights or Natural Rights? A 
Conceptual Analysis from the Juridical Theory of Ronald Dworkin], 90 BOLETÍN 
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 1207, 1209 (1997) (mentioning Hart and 
Dworkin, along with John Rawls and A. Macintyre, as the most influential authors 
in this area); José Alberto Tamayo Valenzuela, La Teoría del Derecho de H.L.A. 
Hart [H.L.A. Hart’s Theory of Rights], 237 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE 
DERECHO, UNAM 219, 220 (2002) (Mex.). But see Guillermo Lariguet, Conflictos 
Trágicos Genuinos y Respuesta Correcta en torno a algunas ideas de Ronald 
Dworkin [Genuine Tragic Conflicts and the Correct Response in Light of Some of 
Ronald Dworkin’s Ideas], 246 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO, UNAM 
205, 206 (2006) (Mex.) (placing more emphasis on Jon Elster’s work related to 
solomonic justice). 
 16. My particular use of the term neo-constitutionalism is meant to refer to the 
actual decisions of courts in Latin America. See generally CARLOS NINO, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); Mauricio Barberis, 
Neoconsticionalismo, Democracia, e Imperialismo de la Moral, 31 JURÍDICA, 
ANUARIO DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD 
IBEROAMERICANA 325 (2001) (Mex.); see also David Landau, The Two Discourses 
in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling 
Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 687, 709-10, 
733 (2005) (discussing different forms of reformist theories in Latin America, such 
as traditionalism-positivism and constitutionalism, and describing the situation in 
Colombian constitutional adjudication as one where “[a] summary of some 
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judicial lawmaking need not lead inexorably to progressive political 
results. It could promote any number of ends.17 Still, much recent 
constitutional change and judicial action has advanced social justice 
and progressive causes.18 Discussing this phenomenon, Jorge Correa 
Sutil reflects: 
The judiciary, which in the Latin American tradition has not been an 
important forum for the underprivileged to voice their demands, may 
finally become, under the new conditions, an important place to advance 
social justice . . . . At the same time, using the judiciary to advance 
socioeconomic rights represents serious risks, especially in countries 
where judges are not accustomed to hearing arguments based on social 
science data or foreseeing the general effects that a particular decision 
produces on society.19 
Notably, the sorts of reasoning that produce these social justice 
outcomes are not typically perceived as keeping within the normal 
bounds of conventional Latin American judicial practices.20 New 
theories and methods thus offer the promise of consolidating greater 
fundamental rights and guarantees by legitimating different forms of 
 
important cases since 1991 demonstrates the generally liberal bent of recent 
jurisprudence, as well as its connection to new constitutionalist interpretative 
methods”).  
 17. See, e.g., Landau, supra note 16, at 735 (exemplifying the use of judicial 
interpretations to criminalize abortion based on a judge’s interpretation of the right 
to life over the rights of a mother). 
 18. See Allen R. Brewer-Carías, Vice President, Int’l Acad. of Comparative 
Law, General Report on Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in 
Comparative Law 21 (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.allanbrewer 
carias.com (search “Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators,” follow first 
search return link) (summarizing country reports from a host of participating 
national reporters, such as constitutional courts creating human rights 
jurisprudence based on their constitutions). 
 19. Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the 
Underprivileged?, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN 
AMERICA 255, 269-70 (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds., 1999). 
 20. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 39 (explaining how 
“[t]o the civil law fundamentalist, authoritative interpretation by the lawmaker was 
the only possible kind of interpretation”); see also Landau, supra note 16, at 709-
10 (describing how “[t]raditional-positivism is still the dominant outlook within 
Latin American societies; carriers of the new constitutionalism perceive it as being 
something quite new and different within Latin America, part of a transnational 
network of high-level academic/judicial discourse moving towards expansive 
constitutionalism”). 
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legal reasoning in general.21  
Thus, the allure of new interpretation lies in its perceived ability to 
defend results not otherwise easily accepted. Yet in any individual 
case, an interpretive theory could serve either to defend or to critique 
a specific legal position or judicial opinion. No single theory would 
likely legitimate all, or any, specific product of neo-
constitutionalism. Still, this discursive field, generally, affirms that 
proper forms of interpretation exist, even if there is disagreement 
over methods and application. Further, it openly expands legitimate 
legal decision-making beyond logical deduction from law texts.  
For example, Dworkininian interpretivism allows for variation in 
judicial decisions while still maintaining that a Herculean judge 
could find the predominantly correct answer from among the 
differing values contained in legal precedents.22 Likewise, Hartian 
hermeneutics recognizes the open texture of language, yet still limits 
results within a penumbra of social meaning.23 As such, the field has 
the overall effect of defending alternative forms of legal reasoning as 
defensible law, even if some individual cases may end up not being 
interpreted correctly. In this way, the new interpretation supports 
neo-constitutionalism generally, whether or not particular decisions 
by the courts faithfully follow any single approach.24 
 
 21. On the other hand, in Venezuela constitutional court supremacy has 
effectively eroded international human rights protections and freedom of 
expression. 
 22. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-74 (1986) 
(comparing legal interpretation in the common law tradition to writing a chain 
novel stating, “[the Herculean judge] knows that other judges have decided cases 
that, although not exactly like his case, deal with related problems; he must think 
of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then continue, 
according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it 
can be.”). 
 23. See MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that Hart’s attempt bridges 
linguistic philosophy and legal theory by “reconciling scientific and commonsense 
modes of thought”). 
 24. See Conrado Hübner Mendes, Judicial Review of Constitutional 
Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2005) 
(contending that “[t]he constitutionalist has a crucial role within a constitutional 
democracy [and] [a]bove all, he is expected to offer sound arguments for the 
protection of fundamental rights, not in the courts alone, but also in the various 
institutional spaces which form the public sphere.”). 
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C. THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE  
Much of the new interpretation shares an underlying structure. It 
rests on a defining distinction, pitting conventional legal practices in 
Latin America against alternative, transnational interpretive theories. 
Usually it is reasonable to distinguish between practice and theory, 
and, in fact, it is quite common. It is also not unreasonable to 
consider local practices in light of foreign experiences. More 
curiously, though, the new interpretation is structured around a 
somewhat different dichotomy: it typically juxtaposes an 
unrelentingly formalist Latin American practice against idealized, 
post-legal-realist reconstructive theories of liberal law in the global 
North. The poles are thus neither simply theory and practice, nor 
horizontal comparisons of Latin America and the global North.  
Indeed, the common critiques of liberal legalism are stressed in 
Latin America, while transnational interpretive theories appear to 
offer effective practices. Within this dynamic, conventional local 
forms are thus automatically rejected or simply ignored in favor of 
aspirations to, e.g., Dworkinian interpretivism, Hartian hermeneutics, 
or Alexian principles.25 This arrangement may serve as a useful 
catalyst for interpretation discourse but is quite counterproductive to 
reinforcing the standing of law in the region. I have described in 
earlier work how the rather permanent critique of legal failure in 
Latin America is partly the product of a projection of internal 
critiques of liberal law everywhere as an exceptional, external 
diagnosis of Latin American national legal systems in particular.26 
Considering the critiques simply reflect inherent limitations of 
liberalism, however, they are never fully remediable from a 
committedly legal realist perspective.27 Such a hyper-realist 
characterization of failure is constantly available to argue for a 
change in laws and legal institutions. In the context of the new 
interpretation in Latin America, it appears that the image of legal 
failure is once again at work, providing the specific springboard for 
 
 25. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers 
trans., 2002); DWORKIN, supra note 22; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d. 
ed. 1994). 
 26. See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 75, 109-16 (2008) (analyzing the ways in which academic discourse 
has contributed to the portrayal of Latin American law as “failed law”). 
 27. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) . 
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interpretationist discourse. The section below describes the sources 
of this failed law background in more detail.  
II. THE FAILED LAW BACKGROUND 
The turn to legal interpretation can be seen, ironically enough, as a 
response to the very pronouncements of Latin American legal failure 
advanced by “law and development” writings. The latter have 
significantly influenced comparative law scholarship and various 
other disciplines focused on the region.28 Specifically related to the 
legal culture, the conventional development view portrays Latin 
American legal reasoning as an anachronistic and impoverished form 
of Western legal analysis. It also presumes that in the global North 
modern versions of legal analysis are effectively operational. As I 
have argued, this standard assessment can be understood as the 
aggregate of images and characterizations marshaled in favor of or 
against different projects of legal politics.29 They stand as 
instrumental constructions that have been advanced and have taken 
hold to further historical and current attempts to change law and 
legal institutions. This instrumental image, while effective to 
advocate for law reform, has significant downsides.  
“Interpretationists” appear to rely on and reinforce this same 
diagnosis of law’s failure in the region, while reproducing idealized 
versions of liberal law elsewhere as actually practicable and 
operational. While such idealized results are hardly attainable, at 
least within our current state of human limitations, their 
unsatisfactory effects are projected and amplified onto Latin America 
as an argument for reform. Projecting these constant limitations of 
the system onto Latin America has been a successful rhetoric for 
triggering law reform.30 It comes at the high cost, however, of 
 
 28. See Esquirol, supra note 26, at 112-14 (arguing that scholars continuously 
paint a picture of “Latin American legal failure”). 
 29. I have written extensively about these topics before. My focus in the past 
has been to describe the central paradigms that serve principally for transnational 
legal politics in Latin America, specifically the Europeanness of Latin American 
law and alternatively the failure of liberal legalism in the region. Additionally, I 
have demonstrated how these paradigms are mirrored internally in Latin America 
and have concrete effects in terms of local legal politics. In this Essay, my focus is 
to demonstrate how this same framing is also part of the legal interpretation 
discourse in the region and portends some troubling results. 
 30. See id. at 76 (linking the images of Latin American law as “ineffective and 
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consolidating a constant image of the failure of liberal legal models 
in Latin America. Each new round of reform conducted in this way 
further entrenches the same negative perceptions. The subsections 
that follow lay out the sources of the legal failure diagnosis and 
summarize some of my earlier work. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
The past fifty years have seen a significant rise in exchange 
between the United States and Latin American states in the legal 
sphere. This exchange is chiefly due to funding of initiatives by the 
U.S. government, U.S.-based foundations, and U.S.-influenced 
international organizations. These efforts have generally been 
grouped together and described as the “law and development” 
movement.31 In the extensive literature on the topic, scholars have 
noted the movement’s different phases, changing political 
orientation, and general theoretical presuppositions.32 For the most 
part, however, the phenomenon has been addressed primarily from 
the supply side of the equation.33 The focus has been on the types of 
projects funded, their political economy, and the objectives of 
funding organizations. Scholars have also expounded on the mostly 
 
inappropriate” and Latin American judges as “inefficient and corrupt” with 
development agendas created to increase human rights protections and reform 
criminal procedure and the judiciary in the region). 
 31. See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the 
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 457, 457-67 (1977) (discussing how the “law and development 
movement” developed in the 1960s and involved law reform through societal 
changes, social engineering, and foreign assistance). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 484-89 (providing a bibliography of 125 works written on 
Law & Development); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 120 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (explaining how 
the law and development movement in the U.S. “exported styles of legal 
pragmatism and antiformalism” to developing states); José E. Alvarez, Promoting 
the “Rule of Law” in Latin America: Problems and Prospects, 25 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT’L L. & ECON. 281, 281-82 (1991) (focusing on the Administration of Justice 
Program that the United States employed to promote the rule of law and 
development in Latin America during and after the Cold War). See generally 
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID 
IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (providing a detailed history of the U.S.-led, early law 
and development movement in Latin America). 
 33. See e.g., David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the 
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 6-9 (1972) (arguing that “modern 
law” is a prerequisite for economic and political development). 
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tacit legal theories underlying these efforts, primarily an uncritical 
faith in the effectiveness of the U.S. legal system and its positive 
correlation with economic growth.34 At the same time, others have 
noted the imperial nature of these assumptions and designs.35 
Additionally, attention has been directed to the actual beneficiaries of 
these projects, both governments in power and specific individuals 
who may benefit from the resources and clout they offer.36 
B. THREE DIFFERENT PERIODS  
In terms of specific projects, three different periods are generally 
noted, including the original 1960-70’s developmental state round, 
the 1990’s neo-liberal round, and the more recent social justice 
moment.37 In the 1960-70s, the funding organizations were either the 
U.S. government or U.S. based foundations, specifically the United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and the 
Ford Foundation. The objective in this first round was state-led 
growth, planning and control by regulatory agencies, and 
government reallocation of resources.38 It was supported by 
 
 34. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law 
and Legal Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 767, 767 
(1972) (discussing the appropriateness of U.S. legal structures in the assistance of 
developing social welfare in both the United States and abroad); Lawrence M. 
Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 12 (1969) (declaring 
that American legal imperialism is never criticized with regards to “its sense, its 
propriety, its rationale” in promoting economic development). 
 35. See generally GARDNER, supra note 32; David M. Trubek & Marc 
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1063-64 
(proposing that doubts regarding legal development projects’ contributions have 
led to “self-estrangement” by failing to promote equality and freedom). In the 
latter article, note that Trubek problematizes many of his earlier ideas regarding 
the exportation of instrumental law to developing countries. 
 36. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES 48 (2002). 
 37. See generally David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third 
Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical 
Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 1-18 (describing each movement beginning with the 
1960s and the role of the state including the 1980s and the neoliberal law reform, 
the 1990s and economic development, and today’s social welfare movement). 
 38. See Franck, supra note 34, at 772 (informing that conventionally, to 
establish growth in industry, the state should promote “national unification [and] 
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Keynesian economics, placing the state as the principal agent of 
development. The objective in the legal sphere was a pragmatic state 
regulatory law, capable of effectively implementing government 
planning and transcending vested private rights with the potential to 
impede government action.39 Outwardly, legal development 
assistance was introduced as part of state modernization.40 Early 
projects emphasized improving legal education and consequently the 
legal culture.41 Developmentalists believed the right prescription was 
American-style legal realism and policy-oriented lawyering.42 In fact, 
 
the creation of stable and viable communities and markets,” which lead to social 
welfare). 
 39. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and 
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 95, 104 (suggesting that the more detailed 
disputes concerned with “legislative and administrative positivism” were less 
important than the general principle that the state should implement regulatory 
schemes). But see Diego López Medina, El Sueño Weberiano: Claves para una 
Comprensión Constitucional de la Estructura Adminsitrativa del Estado 
Colombiano [The Weberian Dream: Keys to Constitutional Comprehension of the 
Administrative Structure of the Colombian State], REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO, 
June 2006, at 3, 30-33 (discussing the Colombian constitutional reform of 1968 
and decentralization). 
 40. See generally Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in 
MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 153, 154-56 (Myron Weiner ed., 
1966) (offering eleven features of modern law—uniform, transactional, 
universalistic, hierarchical, bureaucratic, rational, professional, technical, 
amendable, political, and separate from the legislature and executive—which must 
be developed and sustained as a part of modernization). 
 41. See, e.g., Edward A. Laing, Revolution in Latin American Legal Education: 
The Colombian Experience, 6 LAW. AM. 370, 371 (1974) (explicating that the 
Colombian liberal-professionalism period promoted legal education, medicine, and 
engineering); John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs I: The Chile 
Law Program, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 481-85 (2000) (indicating that the purpose 
of the legal education program in Chile was to create a foundation of legal 
professionals who would in turn help the legal infrastructure); Henry J. Steiner, 
Legal Education and Socio-Economic Change: Brazilian Perspectives, 19 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 39, 39 (1971) (stating that the “purposes, content and methods” of legal 
education are affected by society’s perceptions of the law); see also Claudio Souto, 
Sociology of Law: A New Perspective in Brazilian Legal Education, 58 ARCHIV 
FÜR RECHTS UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 237, 243 (1972) (stressing the importance of 
socio-juridical theory and research classes that were offered in Brazil to 
promulgate legal education). 
 42. See generally Carl A. Auerbach, Legal Development in Developing 
Countries: The American Experience, 63 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 81, 81-90 
(1969) (describing the development of the U.S. legal system in areas such as 
antitrust, consumer rights, and workers’ rights). 
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in the first period, the main focus was to transform Latin American 
law schools along U.S. lines. 
In the late 1980s and 1990s neo-liberal round, more international 
organizations became involved, many of them following the lead of 
the United States or U.S.-controlled entities.43 These organizations 
included the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, 
and early donors like the Ford Foundation and USAID. Additionally, 
European Union and European national agencies have more recently 
participated in projects of this type, albeit less in Latin America than 
in Africa and the Maghreb.44 This second period was dominated by 
 
 43. See, e.g., Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Elements of Reform 3-6, 64-71 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 319, 
1996) (discussing the relationship between economic development and judicial 
reform in Latin America, and recommending that the World Bank and other 
development institutions support the efforts of local governments and NGOs to 
promote procedural and structural reforms in the judiciary); LINN A. 
HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN 
AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21-25 (1998) 
(explaining that the United States and other funders were attracted by the 
“progressive, humanistic reform” taking place in Latin American countries in the 
mid-1990s); Fernando Carrillo, The Inter-American Development Bank, in JUSTICE 
DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 149-154 (Edmundo Jarquín & 
Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998) (presenting the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
activities in the region, including a program in Colombia to increase the capacity 
of the Office of the Public Prosecutor); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY 
AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE 
RULE OF LAW 163-175 (2000) (critiquing the incrementalist approach to legal 
reform advocated by international development agencies, and highlighting failures 
of this strategy in El Salvador, Brazil, and Argentina); Thomas Carothers, The 
Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America, in THE RULE OF LAW IN 
LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4-16 
(Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001) (identifying four main types of “rule 
of law aid” in Latin America including democracy-building, economic 
development, human rights, and transnational crime prevention, and arguing that 
the expansion of assistance programs in recent decades has led to competing 
agendas). 
 44. For discussion of German investment in Chile, see James M. Cooper, 
Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of Chile, 29 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 501, 527-36 (2008) (describing Germany’s financial and technical 
assistance in reforming the Chilean Criminal Procedure Code as one example of 
Germany’s strong influence over Chile’s legal culture). See also Máximo Langer, 
Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from 
the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 663-64 (2007) (detailing investments by 
Germany and Spain to expand economic development in Latin American 
countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua). 
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neo-classical economics with its focus on free markets, privatization, 
and de-regulation. Accordingly, the principal objectives for law were 
the protection of private property, enforcement of contracts, 
regulation of securities markets, and enforcement of criminal law. At 
the same time, human rights concerns and access to justice for the 
poor also figured into the agenda of second wave developmentalism, 
especially during its early years.45 
The first two periods of law and development funding had very 
different economic theories driving them. The third more 
contemporary moment arises from the backlash against orthodox 
neo-liberalism.46 The response on the part of donors has been to 
incorporate more social justice and minority rights concerns within 
their project funding priorities.47 Whether this change is significant 
or alters any of the main underlying propositions of neo-liberal 
developmentalism remains to be seen. 
C. DEVELOPMENT TRANSNATIONALISM 
An alternative way of conceptualizing law and development, other 
than as a succession of projects and periods, is as a separate 
paradigm of transnationalism. It can be usefully compared to the 
more traditional European legal transnationalism described above.48 
Structurally, the projects fit a somewhat different pattern. Rather 
than a common legal family as in European transnationalism, the 
 
 45. See Carothers, supra note 43, at 10-11 (observing that international donors 
have begun directing assistance at grassroots human rights groups as a way to 
address inequality in Latin America); Sutil, supra note 19, at 269-70 (noting that, 
historically, poor or marginalized groups have not viewed the judiciary as a 
legitimate forum for their issues, but acknowledging that such groups have recently 
capitalized on judicial reform in several Latin American countries to bring public 
interest claims). 
 46. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 37, at 10 (illustrating that law and 
development and neoliberalism were efforts to promote “free market ideas of 
classical legal thought”). 
 47. See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 203, 203-09 
(highlighting the recent shift in development policy towards incorporating social 
objectives such as health and education as an economic growth strategy, and 
analyzing how this new agenda both shapes, and is shaped by, social and human 
rights issues). 
 48. See supra Part I(A). 
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guiding image is foreign assistance by developed to lesser-developed 
countries, whereby donors sponsor legal change in countries lacking 
developed law.  
In this way, law and development provides an alternative logic for 
reasoning about the law. It can propel very differently-oriented 
projects on its account.49 It also can draw on various legal theories 
for justification and redounds to the benefit of governments and 
individuals capable of mobilizing its resources. Law and 
development promotes prosperity and democracy, namely economic 
and political development, through better versions of law or the rule 
of law, tout court. The many conflicting political aspirations of 
societal actors all appear equally attainable simply through the right 
mix of positive law, public institutions, and legal culture. 
Development transnationalism offers a legal terrain in which to work 
out the problems of poor economies, human rights violations, and 
deficient democracy.  
Thus, as an epistemic construct, development transnationalism 
provides a rationale for a wide range of legal change at the level of 
positive law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning. It orients this 
activity under the rubric of promoting development, and it provides 
significant legitimacy by the weight of foreign and local experts, 
international organizations, and scholarly consensus. Additionally, in 
Latin America, transnationalism is a historically accepted and 
privileged driver of legal change. Indeed, the historical deep-seated 
roots of European transnationalism as a mode of legal reasoning and 
legitimization pave the way for different modes of transnationalism, 
such as this form of development transnationalism. 
D. FAILED LAW 
Notably salient within the paradigm of development 
transnationalism is the counterpoint image of the poor quality of 
legal systems in Latin America. And yet, in many Latin American 
countries, law and legal institutions are well-developed elements of 
national social systems. Latin American states are not lacking in law, 
in fact some say there may be too much of it. There are abundant law 
schools and law graduates. Political leaders and government officials 
 
 49. See, e.g., Carothers, supra 43, fig. 1.1 (illustrating the wide array of actors, 
agendas, and institutions involved in law and development projects). 
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often have legal training. Moreover, law and legal discourse from 
Europe and the United States have been primary tools of governance 
over these countries’ nearly two-hundred years of independence.  
As such, law and development’s main tenet that the existence of 
law is central to prosperity and democracy would seem to call for a 
better explanation in Latin America. There, the legal systems, while 
extensive, have ostensibly failed to deliver. As a first hypothesis, a 
diagnosis pointing to the absence of Western conceptions of liberal 
law is not really plausible. As noted above, Latin American societies 
are steeped in Western law, and legal institutions pervade much of 
society.50 Instead, the common diagnosis of legal failure more 
typically points to the type of Western or liberal law and legal 
institutions in Latin America.51 
This explanation, however, is assembled in some very peculiar 
ways. The general diagnosis suffers from at least three different 
types of flaws. First, particular problems or issues in one location are 
generalized and projected onto Latin America as a whole. 
Conclusions are based less on detailed empirical and contextual 
analyses than on overall assertions about commonalities. Thus, for 
example, the adversarial system and oral hearings have been 
promulgated as the proper solution for both weak law enforcement in 
Colombia and insufficient protection of defendants’ rights in Chile, 
implicitly conflating the issues into one generic critique of Latin 
American criminal procedure.52 In both cases, the solution is 
propelled by the purported, all-around superiority of the 
development-supported adversarial system.53  
 
 50. See supra Part I(A). 
 51. See, e.g., Esquirol, supra note 26, at 106-07 (noting the common neo-
development critique that Latin American criminal procedure is too “inquisitorial” 
and therefore less democratic than the U.S. model). 
 52. See generally Michael R. Paul, Wanted: Criminal Justice – Colombia’s 
Adoption of a Prosecutorial System of Criminal Procedure, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L. 
J. 608, 610 (1992/1993) (blaming impunity in Colombia on the country’s 
“antiquated justice system,” the inquisitorial model); Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra 
Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and Prospects for 
Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 323, 325-26 (1998) 
(listing lack of an independent judiciary, delay, and lack of judicial power over the 
police as additional problems arising out of the inquisitorial system in Chile). 
 53. But see Langer, supra note 44, at 667-69 (arguing that Latin American 
activists thought critically about the reforms, looking to a plethora of European 
codes in the drafting process and choosing to incorporate only those ideas that best 
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Second, units of analysis stemming from particular political or 
cultural preferences in the United States or the North Atlantic are 
applied to the Latin American context indiscriminately.54 The 
nonexistence of that same political or cultural combination in some 
places in Latin America is then used to show an institutional failure. 
For example, proponents of a law and development perspective may 
prefer constitutional change through judicial interpretation rather 
than through amendments or new constitutions, even though it is not 
necessarily clear that one is preferable to the other. Indeed, 
diametrical judicial re-interpretations of constitutional law may 
shake public confidence in the rule of law, especially in populations 
not thoroughly imbued in liberal legal ideology. Yet in Latin 
America, constitutional change through new texts is often 
characterized as evidence of constitutional failure.55 To give another 
example, the lobbying of lawmakers and regulators by regulated 
industries is deemed perfectly legal in the United States, but the 
practice of ex parte communications with judges in many Latin 
American legal systems is often seen as evidence of corruption.56 
While in some cases the legality in the one and corruption in the 
other may be clear, the difference is not universally obvious. These 
are just some of many other possible examples. 
E. ENDEMIC ELEMENTS OF FAILURE 
The two types of flaws, described above, can be considered 
problems of insufficient context and narrow functionalism. There is 
another type of flaw, however, that is more difficult to correct: 
internal critiques of classical legal theory in the West are used to 
reveal the “deficiencies” in Latin American law in a manner that 
 
fit “the needs of Latin America’s social and political reality”). 
 54. See GARDNER, supra note 32, at 4 (critiquing American legal assistance to 
Latin America as “a rather awkward mix of goodwill, optimism, self-interest, 
arrogance, ethnocentricity, and simple lack of understanding”). 
 55. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United 
States and its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
L. REV. 1, 7, 20-30, Appendix A (1990) (citing the fact that Latin American 
republics have promulgated an average of 12.65 constitutions per country as 
evidence of the failure of constitutionalism in Latin America, and identifying 
reasons for this failure, inter alia, the failure of economic integration, a lack of 
“real revolutionary change,” and the “imported flavor” of the constitutions 
themselves). 
 56. Dakolias, supra note 43, at 35-36. 
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portrays these perceived deficiencies as specific or intrinsic to Latin 
America.57  
First, Latin American law is often portrayed as “backward,” in the 
sense that its legal culture is perceived as being dominated by 
positivism and conceptual formalism in a manner that is reminiscent 
of the past in the West.58 Additionally, the theories of a handful of 
European jurists are believed to represent “the whole of legal 
consciousness in the region.”59 Notably, ideas commensurate to legal 
realism and pragmatic legal reasoning are believed to have not yet 
arrived.60  
The second major critique is the gap between law and society in 
Latin America. The gap refers to the distance between the law 
 
 57. On internal critique, see generally Joseph William Singer, The Player and 
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 10-14 (1984) (explaining 
that internal critique is a mode of challenging the internal logic of traditional legal 
theory, and giving the following example of an internal critique of determinacy: if 
traditional legal theorists and judges are correct that legal doctrine is outcome 
determinate, then by their own standards, the rule of law does not exist in systems 
that allow for judicial discretion). To understand traditional critiques of Latin 
American law, it is useful to review the classical critiques of liberal legal theory. 
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3-7 (1992) (noting the Progressive 
attack on the “orthodoxy of the old order,” namely Classical Legal Thought, and 
explaining that the Progressive critique sought to both undermine the notion that 
law is neutral and make law more relevant to modern society); DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 261 (1975) (noting that legal 
realism’s central project was to highlight the inconsistency between judicial 
activism under the due process clause and the corresponding claim by judges that 
applying law is a neutral and apolitical process). 
 58. For an overview of such critiques, see Jorge L. Esquirol, Writing the Law of 
Latin America, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 693, 705-07 (noting that the focus of 
these critiques is always on replacing “outdated” or overly formalistic Latin 
American laws and institutions, rather than on engaging with those that are 
currently in place). The image of Latin America as “formalist” is not unlike 
classical legal thought or Lochnerism in the United States. Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). See generally PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM 
POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 1-5 (1990) (introducing the 
Lochner decision and explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s turn to “economic 
policymaking”). 
 59. See Esquirol, supra note 58, at 707 (2009) (providing the example of 
Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen). 
 60. See, e.g., John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin 
America, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 50, 77 (1996) (noting the hesitance of Latin 
American scholars to embrace legal realism despite the influence of U.S. law in the 
region). 
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practiced by ordinary people and the law on the books,61 a 
disjuncture which is deemed inordinately wider in Latin America 
than elsewhere.62 One of the most salient images about law in the 
region is that it is both pervasive in development writing63 and 
supported by various works of legal history and social science.64 
Notably, this notion is deployed by many different camps, both more 
traditional scholars and legal pluralists alike, the latter possibly 
influenced by their interest in elevating the stature of particular group 
law relative to the law of the state. Moreover, some progressive 
scholars have described the gap in terms of the symbolic versus 
 
 61. See id. at 54-60 (describing the conflict between the rules that govern the 
informal sector and the official legal system in Latin America, namely that the 
formal system serves elite interests leading most Latin Americans to ignore it); see 
also KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN 
AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 58 (1975) (asserting that various “historical and cultural 
factors” are to blame for this disparity, including “idealism, paternalism, legalism, 
formalism, and lack of penetration”). 
 62. See KARST & ROSENN, supra note 61, at 58 (calling the gap “notoriously 
large”). 
 63. See, e.g., Mariana Hernández Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in 
Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow of the Law Through Citizen Participation, 
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 92-97 (2008) (arguing that, although Latin 
American law purports to protect citizens, neither courts nor alternative dispute 
resolution enforce these laws effectively, and concluding that participatory 
lawmaking is essential to strengthening dispute resolution systems in Latin 
America); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 2-5 (1984) (describing, as evidence of the gap between law and 
society, the jeito, a Brazilian way of “coping with the formal legal system” by 
bending or bypassing law in established and culturally acceptable ways to achieve 
a just result). See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin 
American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53-57 (2003) (highlighting the emergence of 
development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s to address the “wide rift” between 
state law and social practice in Latin America, including legal reform, legal 
education, and the increased examination of values and actors within the informal 
sector). 
 64. See, e.g., M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 235-38 (2004) (describing the gap 
between law and practice as “a perplexing problem for historians of Latin 
American law and . . . a frustrating reality for citizens” and surveying a variety of 
views about this gap); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass 
of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 5-6, 14-24 (2006) (linking the gap between 
law and practice in Latin America to the history of law’s subordination to political 
and economic power in the region). But see Esquirol, supra note 26, at 79-80 
(arguing that the common view that a gap exists between written and practiced law 
in Latin America constitutes an instrumental argument providing fuel for 
development reform proposals). 
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operative value of law, a perspective which critiques socially 
responsive legislation on the basis of its frustrating inefficacy.65  
Third, Latin America is viewed as importing culturally 
inappropriate European law. This element of the diagnosis is not 
unrelated to the measure of the gap between law and society; it 
figures as one explanation for the gap. Essentially, though, it is the 
flip side of Latin America’s historical European legal 
transnationalism, which serves a number of functions and can be 
seen as simply a different sort of transnational paradigm. Within the 
alternate development paradigm, it becomes one of the elements of 
the diagnosis of malfunction. Indeed, from this perspective, the deep 
engagement in European transnationalism is one of the sources of 
legal failure in the region.  
A fourth oft-echoed critique is elite control of the law. This 
observation may express a more radical point about liberal law in 
capitalist societies: it can mean that the rule of law simply masks the 
true sources of power in society. In its development version, it 
conjures the particular salience of a Latin American oligarchy in 
control of the state, and it functions as an indictment of that sector of 
society resistant, for one reason or another, to proposed legal 
changes. Further, development reformers often denote it as lack of 
“political will” by the powers-that-be. This position conceives 
development reform as technical improvement up against illegitimate 
self-interest, lethargy, or ignorance. It ignores the political and 
distributional stakes inherent in both existing law and reforms, and it 
groups together those that may be politically or economically 
opposed with those simply standing to lose ill-gotten rents. However, 
not in all cases is resistance to a particular legal change exclusive to 
the elites, just like not all law reform benefits the poor.  
In short, statements of the above-type are well-known critiques 
found in the history of jurisprudence in the United States and in 
Europe.66 In the development context, they are more often expressed 
 
 65. See, e.g., Claudia Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption as Seen 
From the Brazilian Favelas, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 397, 397-404 (2002) 
(evaluating the potential of the newly enacted Children’s Code to regulate 
clandestine adoption in Brazil, in light of Brazil’s history of passing legislation 
that, while touted by the international community as highly progressive, in reality 
has little impact on the lives of ordinary Brazilians). 
 66. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 9-10 (discussing broadly the 
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in the U.S. vernacular. For example, the backwardness of law can be 
traced to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s observations about law in the 
United States in his article, The Path of the Law.67 Holmes expressed 
the need of every generation to update its law in its own language 
and in terms of its own uses.68 Scholars note Holmes’s role as a 
precursor to legal realism and a critic of formalism.69 Critiques of 
conceptual formalism in the United States were a mainstay of legal 
realists in the 1920s and 1930s in the United States.70 Realism 
sparked a loss of faith in logical abstraction at the level performed by 
the then-reigning classical legal thought.71 Abstract principles were 
as a result no longer generally believed capable of rendering concrete 
results in specific cases.72 Further, the gap between the law on the 
books and law in action commonly is attributed to Roscoe Pound and 
his sociological jurisprudence.73 Here was yet another attempt to 
 
history of American legal thought and highlighting the struggle against the 
“autonomy of law,” which had lost touch with society); KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 
78-79 (comparing the development of American and European jurisprudence). 
 67. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897). 
 68. See id. at 468-69 (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule 
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”). 
 69. See William Fisher, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT 23 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006) 
(discussing the advances Holmes made in the discourse and debate about legal 
theory, such as by advocating that judges analyze the law through the perspective 
of social welfare as opposed to “fairness”). 
 70. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 824, 842-43 (1935) (criticizing questions 
posed by functionalists as meaningless and proffering realistic jurisprudence as a 
much more useful method of examining legal theory). 
 71. See KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 261 (discussing how the criticism of 
private law concepts as “illusory” or inoperative became an attack on the logic of 
the entire legal system). 
 72. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 25 
(1924) (“A large part of what has been asserted concerning the necessity of 
absolutely uniform and immutable antecedent rules of law is in effect an attempt to 
evade the really important issue of finding and employing rules of law, substantive 
and procedural, which will actually secure to the members of the community a 
reasonable measure of practical certainty of expectation in framing their courses of 
conduct.”). 
 73. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 
15-18 (1910) (illustrating “the distinction between legal theory and judicial 
administration” with reference to the Lochner case, employer liability, and the 
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unseat the mechanical or formalist jurisprudence. Gap studies also 
became popular in the 1960s by scholars of law and society.74 They 
were a welcome accompaniment to the bold constitutional changes 
of the Warren court.75 
These critiques or positions within jurisprudence have their 
analogues in the civilian tradition. Indeed, it is an interesting 
question of intellectual history to note their often contemporaneous 
popularity on both sides of the Atlantic. Critics of formalism such as 
Rudolf von Jhering and François Gény can be seen to express similar 
ideas to legal realists and sociological jurisprudes in the United 
States.76 Other parallels include the French juristes inquiets critics of 
legal exegesis, of which Gény was one, the German Free Law 
movement, sociological functionalism, and critical social theory.77 
 
police practice of interrogating criminal suspects). 
 74. See generally David Kennedy, Stewart Macaulay, in THE CANON OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 69, at 447, 454-456 (explaining the 
growth of the Law and Society movement and mentioning the emphasis on 
examining the gap between law and society, such as between contract law and 
actual commercial practice). 
 75. See David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the 
Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 1, 8, 27-28 (1990) (introducing 
the law and society movement and the movement’s link to politics and expansion 
of rights). 
 76. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT 
PRIVÉ POSITIF: ESSAI CRITIQUE [METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES IN 
POSITIVE PRIVATE LAW: CRITICAL ESSAY] (2d. ed. 1954); see also Duncan 
Kennedy & Marie-Claire Belleau, François Gény aux Etats Unis [François Gény 
in the United States], in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS [MYTHS AND 
REALITIES] 304-08 (Yvon Blais ed., 2000) (discussing Gény’s influence on U.S. 
thinkers such as Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and other critics of “Classical Legal 
Thought”). 
 77. See Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and 
Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 386-24 
(outlining the internal and external critiques of the jurists inquiets and their vision 
that law continually evolve to meet social needs); Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism 
and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 128-131 (1984) (explaining critical social 
theory as a form of structuralism, which provides concrete theories on “cultural 
institutions”); James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law 
Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 416-17 
(1987) (summarizing the main tenets of the German Free Law movement as 
skepticism towards traditional methods of legal interpretation, a belief in the 
indeterminacy of law, acknowledgement of the “creative function” of the judge in 
rendering just decisions, and a belief that judges should consider non-legal sources 
and “the social consciousness of the community”); KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 66 
(distinguishing sociological functionalism from the distributive approach in that 
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Some of these jurisprudential commonalities have already been well-
described by comparative scholars, while others remain to be more 
fully explored.  
Whether in Anglo-American legal jurisprudential terms or civilian 
ones, these positions are predominantly internal arguments within 
modern systems of law.78 Historically, they can be traced to 
particular political contexts with real stakes.79 Over time, they can 
also be seen to support particular positions in contests over legal 
decisions and institutional design. In this way, they are part of the 
repertoire of legal political argument, often deployed in favor or 
against particular positions on legal policy, positive law, legal 
institutions, and constitutional adjudication.  
Each of these critiques may have been, at one time, potentially 
devastating attacks on the legitimacy of the existing legal system, but 
for the most part they are currently normalized features of liberal 
legal discourse. Moreover, in the development context, these 
critiques serve not for revolution but for much tamer policy change 
and distributional reallocation within the limits of liberal law. 
Internal critiques of liberalism, turned into diagnosis and reformist 
rhetoric, usher in reforms consisting of other versions of liberal law 
with different positive law rules, institutional design, and historic or 
cultural origins. As such, the source of these critiques can never be 
fully rectified or eliminated through the types of reforms proposed. 
They nonetheless constitute the basis for the general diagnosis of 
legal failure, which provides the rationale for policy change. 
F. CRITIQUE OF FAILED LAW DIAGNOSIS 
This general diagnosis of Latin American law thus consists of a 
series of proto-typical arguments of legal politics. For example, law 
is always susceptible to charges of needed updating. Conceptual 
 
the former analyzes the function of legal institutions in resolving disputes, while 
the latter examines how legal institutions impact disputes). See generally Rodolfo 
Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1, 3 (1991). 
 78. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text. 
 79. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 3-7 (connecting various 
constitutional revolutions and shifts to political crises, such as the World War I 
move away from progressivism to realism, and the World War II trend towards 
conservativism among realists). 
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formalism is an inherent dimension of logical reasoning and its total 
elimination is impossible. What we find to be logically convincing 
may only be phenomenologically produced. In other words, there is 
no clear dividing line between determinacy and indeterminacy. 
Rather, convincing arguments are more clearly a product of shared 
experience varying from reference group to reference group. 
Additionally, the gap between law and action is axiomatically ever 
present. While there may be some rules more closely followed than 
others, a full society-wide measure is quite impossible, and fair 
comparisons are elusive. Both resources for law enforcement and the 
internalization of certain norms play a central role. Furthermore, the 
reasons for rule non-compliance may be so broad-ranging that such a 
measure, even were it possible, would be practically meaningless.  
These internal critiques underlie the central diagnosis of law’s 
ineffectiveness in Latin America. This repertoire of legal arguments, 
in effect, is projected as the external description of Latin American 
legal systems as a whole. As such, the charge of formalism is not 
simply directed at a line of conservative constitutional opinions, but 
rather it becomes a problem of the whole legal culture. The law in 
action is not simply a way of privatizing areas of commercial law, 
but rather it marks the irrelevance of the whole of state law. 
European transnationalism is not simply a mode of legal reasoning, 
but a mark of cultural inappositeness of the social system that is law 
and its exclusivity to a racial and cultural minority in the region. In 
short, the architects of development transnationalism have projected 
these ordinarily legal-political moves as an operational diagnosis. 
This rendering supports proposals for law reform and institutional re-
design. Projects are more easily advanced. Absent a functioning law, 
replacement or substitution appears not only desirable but also 
necessary.  
Over time, these particular explanations and diagnoses buttressing 
particular projects of law reform or funding assistance have 
consolidated a standing narrative about law in Latin America. The 
amalgamation of these mutually reinforcing descriptions has the 
effect of casting legal systems in the region as effectively incapable 
of performing the functions expected of modern law. These enduring 
views have ripened into an identity or common understanding of the 
workings of law in the region. The shortcomings identified and the 
failings decried paint a permanent picture of failure. As noted 
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already, the elements of this diagnosis cannot be reversed through 
simple law reform. They are constantly observable features of liberal 
legal systems. Moreover, these internal critiques passing as 
diagnosis, while insights of jurisprudence on the workings and 
assumptions of liberal legalism, are routine tactical moves within 
legal politics. They are available to advance endless proposals. Thus, 
as failings of the legal system to be rectified and fixed, success is 
never achievable. Their endogeneity to liberal law is what makes 
them continually available as justifications for new reforms.  
III. CRITIQUES OF THE NEW INTERPRETATION 
Many positive things may be said for interpretationism, as it 
supports a progressive political direction advanced by constitutional 
adjudication. It has enlisted a broad array of talented scholars 
participating in debates over law and legal theory. It has deepened 
the ranks of academic legal communities in many countries in Latin 
America. It may be contributing, at least partially, to the perceived 
need, on the part of law school administrators and political leaders, 
to expand Latin America’s legal intelligentsia. The broader 
intellectual community to which interpretationists contribute fills an 
important function in the legitimation of law at a national level.  
At the same time, the particular structure and conceptions 
mobilized by interpretationism may produce some negative and 
unintended effects. The discussion below considers some of these 
points. I should note that these critiques are not direct comments on 
any one individual’s work. Instead, they describe aggregate features 
of interpretationist discourse and their potential effects.  
A. OVERSIMPLIFYING LEGAL FORMALISM  
The new interpretation typically pushes off against a charge of 
legal formalism. It is a principal rationale for considering and 
advocating alternative legal reasoning practices. This claim without 
more, at minimum, echoes the widespread diagnosis of Latin 
American legal failure. It depicts local legal operators as stuck in an 
earlier era of legal consciousness and thus, incapable of performing 
the functions expected of contemporary legal systems, such as 
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policy/principles balancing and contextual analysis.80 This generic 
condemnation goes well beyond a legal realist critique of specific 
judicial decisions.81  
It is useful to recall Duncan Kennedy’s discussion in the U.S. 
context of the two different meanings generally ascribed to legal 
formalism: 
In one usage, formalism is a “theory of law,” though one invented by its 
adversaries rather than by any known [U.S.] proponents. Formalism in 
this sense is the theory that all questions of law can be resolved by 
deduction, that is, without resort to policy, except for questions arising 
under rules that explicitly require policy argument. . . . [Thus] [i]n [the] 
second sense, it charges an adversary either with making the mistake of 
thinking that a particular abstract legal norm can generate a particular 
subrule, or with a general tendency to overestimate the capacity of norms 
in general to generate subrules by deduction.82 
While the bulk of interpretationism does not consider conventional 
local practices directly, both senses appear to be generically invoked. 
Legal dogmatics—as the conventional formalism is commonly 
known—is automatically regarded as both wrong and 
unconvincing.83 In this regard, there is significant agreement across 
the various national discussions about the nature of conventional 
legal thought in the region. It appears as an anachronistic sort of 
classical legal thought.84 Critically missing are operative elements of 
contextual analysis, or anti-formalism, capable of making the law 
 
 80. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL, supra note 32, at 22-23. (The langue/parole distinction is very useful 
here. The claim of this essay is that the new interpretation is likely a parole/parole 
shift rather than a change of langues.) 
 81. See HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 193 (noting that realism was the outgrowth 
of attacks on classical legal thought and that realism had a long-lasting impact on 
legal thought). 
 82. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 105-06. 
 83. See NINO, supra note 5, at 22 (dismissing legal dogmatics as ineffective at 
assessing legal materials or overcoming “indeterminacies”). 
 84. See HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 4-5 (attacking classical legal thought as 
inadequate to address the inconsistencies between the common law and the 
“individualistic premises of a self-executing market economy” which had become 
part of the American social construct); KARST & ROSENN, supra note 61, at 58 (re-
emphasizing that the gap between the written law and practiced law was partly due 
to factors such as idealism and formalism). 
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more responsive to local conditions and national policy goals.85 
Certainly, the outward aesthetics of conventional legal reasoning 
in Latin America can appear overly abstract, positivist, or 
theoretical.86 Moreover, it is widely described as outwardly opaque 
and lacking in local context.87 Its elements often consist of 
continental European citations, conceptualist hierarchies, and 
deductivist logic.88 Still, as noted above, this mode serves as the 
mode of legal reasoning and meaning-making in legal communities 
across the region. Moreover, European-inflected legal dogmatics has 
not completely eluded transnational engagement with U.S. legal 
culture.89 In the area of constitutional law, for example, U.S. legal 
sources, if often through the intermediation of European authors, 
have been particularly salient.90 Admittedly, Anglo-American 
authorities have not historically constituted the primary language of 
legal reasoning or the main referents of legal discourse. Nonetheless, 
a defining element of law in Latin America is its permeability to 
European and U.S. sources.91 
 
 85. See Esquirol, supra note 63, at 104, 112-13. 
 86. On the aesthetics of law, see generally Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of 
American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1050-51 (2002) (introducing “the forms, 
images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities” that shape the creation of American 
law, including grid, energy, perspectivist, and dissociative aesthetics). 
 87. See, e.g., Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the 
Formal Legal System and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514, 
529-31 (1971) (noting that jurists and scholars rarely debate the “economic, social, 
political, or administrative” aspects of legislation; rather, debates focus on which 
universal principles the law ought to incorporate). 
 88. Esquirol, supra note 63, at 59. 
 89. This engagement, however, may be rather one-sided. See, e.g., Garro, supra 
note 8, at 598 (lamenting Latin American law’s exclusion from U.S. comparative 
law courses). 
 90. See Jacob Dolinger, The Influence of American Constitutional Law on the 
Brazilian Legal System, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 803, 805 (1990) (giving several 
examples of U.S. influence on Brazilian public law, including one case in which a 
Brazilian Supreme Court Justice cited Marbury v. Madison); Jonathan Miller, 
Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its 
Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 99-100 (1997) 
(noting the strong influence of the U.S. Constitution on original Argentine 
constitutionalism, especially judicial review). 
 91. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 9, at 5 (pointing out, for 
example, that both the U.S. and Latin American legal traditions have their origin in 
European law). Indeed this view is pervasive throughout comparative scholarship. 
But see generally Esquirol, supra note 10, at 427 (critiquing comparativist, René 
David’s, reading of Latin American law as European). 
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The new interpretation thus paints a very incomplete picture, if 
much of any picture at all, of dominant legal practices in Latin 
American countries. It under-theorizes the actual practices of 
national courts and their commentators. In their place, it substitutes a 
generic image of legal formalism, piggy-backing on the development 
diagnosis. However, this characterization understates the ways in 
which existing practices further specific interests over others and 
serve to distribute resources.92 It also discounts a present political and 
social context that impacts legal reasoning, thereby contributing to its 
construction.93 Additionally, it underestimates the practical 
responsiveness of local legal reasoning to foreign legal developments 
and trends in light of its receptiveness to comparative law and 
foreign sources. 
This argument is not a defense of any particular line of legal 
reasoning labeled formalist in any particular case in any particular 
legal community in Latin America. Rather, it suggests that the new 
interpretation’s depiction of “formalism” is rather incomplete. 
Further, the quest for a countervailing anti-formalist decision-
making, to the extent it signifies contextually aware and purposive 
action, may be somewhat misdirected.94 It may undermine its very 
ability to stand for law. 
B. SIDE-STEPPING LEGAL REALISM 
In their opposition to formalism, interpretationists appear to make 
a legal realist critique. However, their interventions consist of both 
more and less than legal realism.95 It is more in that interpretationists 
draw on the ambient image of Latin American legal failure. This 
reference extends beyond a critique of unconvincing legal analysis in 
a particular case, line of cases, or legal area. It is also more than the 
 
 92. See Esquirol, supra note 58, at 731-32 (concluding that the “U.S.-Latin 
American legal transnationalism is . . . privileged” and does not fully take into 
account all locally available legal and political options, frustrating local legal 
institutions). 
 93. See Esquirol, supra note 10, at 463-64 (noting that much comparative 
scholarship on Latin America has suppressed “societal particularity” and focused 
instead on the “European character” of the region’s law). 
 94. Cf. Esquirol, supra note 63, at 107-08 (noting the reclamation of formalism 
as “authentic” by some progressive Latin American legal scholars in reaction to 
“the legacy of failed developmentalism” of earlier decades). 
 95. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 4. 
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sum of observations that law in any one area is out of step with social 
norms. Rather, it casts the whole of national legal culture, including 
legal reasoning, cases, and norms, as unconvincing to and 
disconnected from the societies that have generated them. This 
pervasive diagnosis of law in the region rests on a variety of internal 
critiques of liberal legalism turned into external evaluations of law in 
Latin America as a whole, as has been described already. This 
generalized view has not only been a principal catalyst for 
internationally assisted law reform, but it is also a common feature 
within national legal politics. In this context, the new interpretation is 
driven by this hyper-realist generalization of liberal legalism’s failure 
in Latin America.  
Thus, rather than developing a sustained legal realist analysis of 
specific cases or doctrinal arguments—whether of the positions of 
traditionalists or neo-constitutionalism—interpretationists appear 
more drawn to the well-accepted diagnosis of Latin American legal 
failure for their impetus, with formalism as one of its standard 
characteristics. Discussing the reception of interpretationism in Latin 
America, Diego Lopez Medina notes: 
[O]ne could also realize that the jurisprudential discourse in Latin 
America tends on occasion to separate more clearly between jurisprudes 
and non-jurisprudes than what it separates between formalists and non-
formalists. We will discover, then, a continuous effort on the part of 
sophisticated lawyers-jurisprudes to undo the much more traditionalist 
positions of the professional lawyer, little concerned with the theoretical 
foundations of the law. When that happens, all sorts of jurisprudential 
positions (either formalist or anti-formalist) are situated to the left (to the 
critical side) of the standard legal theory.96 
Indeed, legal realism of this heightened, unrelenting kind is 
already well-entrenched within the perception of Latin Americans 
and in the eyes of transnational observers, especially on the 
shortcomings of liberal law. Its prominence can be seen as 
underwriting a large part of the generalized image of law’s failure in 
the region. It simply restates and confirms these common views.  
At the same time, however, the new interpretation is also less than 
legal realist critique. It puts a great amount of faith in transnational 
 
 96. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 83-84. 
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reconstructive proposals for liberal law. It ignores the equally 
formalist character of these new interpretive theories, at least in the 
eyes of their critics.97 As such, the new interpretation is not a realist 
intervention. It is propelled by both a hyper-realist view of Latin 
American legal practices and a faith in liberal law elsewhere. In this 
arena of legal politics, the reference to formalism for 
interpretationists appears synonymous with conventional Latin 
American legal reasoning practices. It substitutes for specific 
critiques of legal reasoning in particular cases or areas. It also 
sidesteps the work of showing the unconvincingness of particular 
legal practices. Rather, it rests on the generalized negative perception 
of law in Latin America as the justification for new methods. Anti-
formalism signifies alternative, presumably operationally effective 
forms of transnationally recognized methods of legal interpretation.  
C. IDEALIZING TRANSNATIONAL THEORIES  
At the other end of the equation, new interpretationists propose a 
range of transnational methods and theories, presumably more 
responsive to local realities, while still resistant to judicial 
manipulation. The alternative theories called upon typically focus on 
common law judges, fundamental rights, constitutional decisions, 
and reasoned judicial opinions.98 Anglo-American sources and others 
influenced by legal realism are attractive to Latin American 
“interpretationists.” While the former are generally reconstructivist 
proposals in their home contexts, they nonetheless generally 
incorporate and attempt to respond to a critique of classical legal 
formalism. They eschew simple deduction, while at the same time 
rebutting legal realism. Moreover, they generally are committed to 
professing liberal legalism’s success, while ignoring or defending 
 
 97. See KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 294 (arguing that “the apologetic motive or 
intent has inflected Liberal representations of legal institutions and regimes, 
falsifying or distorting the analyses” through their “denial of the ideological in 
adjudication and of the contradictory nature of the legal regimes produced by 
judicial law making” and suggesting that “the best we can or should hope for is [a] 
chastened theory”). 
 98. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 1-6 (stressing the importance of 
looking at common law judges and their decisions as mechanisms for “social 
revolution”), with ALEXY, supra note 25, at 6-7 (downplaying individual judge’s 
decisions and emphasizing that a series of “value-judgments” is necessary to 
establish normative policy). 
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against significant variation from the ideal. The bulk of new 
interpretation thus draws on reconstructive proposals for liberal law. 
More virulent critiques of these same reconstructive proposals are 
generally eclipsed, perhaps as too destructive of the possibilities for 
interpretive discourse, whose legitimization of actual legal and 
judicial practices is the main objective. 
Thus, beyond rejecting legal formalism, interpretationists propose 
alternatives. They tend to over-idealize possible solutions to the 
inherent contradictions of liberal law, such as subjectivity and 
objectivity, politics and neutrality, indeterminacy and necessity.99 
The new interpretation draws heavily on authors from the global 
North claiming to have surmounted these difficulties. Yet the 
structural aspiration within liberal law to objectivity, neutrality, and 
apolitical-ness are both endemic and insoluble. In practice, they are 
alleviated only through a combination of tentative proposals, wishful 
thinking, political legitimation, and ideological belief sustained by 
specific legal communities to varying degrees.  
This quick snapshot does not require, nor would it be possible, to 
prove in detail that any transnational interpretation theory fails to 
satisfy its own claims. There are those who would argue that, indeed, 
interpretation discourse only produces levels of convincingness for 
some people at some times.100 Nor is it necessary here to determine 
whether any transnational interpretative theory is faithfully applied in 
the global North. For my purposes, it suffices to note that while no 
individual theory of interpretation is universally convincing, this 
field of discourse generally sustains the notion that legal 
interpretation is in fact an achievable enterprise in keeping with the 
claims of liberal law. In this regard, it may be said that theorizing 
about legal interpretation serves an important function in modern 
systems of law: it can be used to present local legal reasoning 
practices as a distinct, apolitical, objective, and neutral mode of 
decision-making. A fuller discussion of the function of legal 
interpretation discourse within the political economy of modern legal 
systems is beyond the scope of this Essay. My purpose here is 
 
 99. See UNGER, supra note 27, at 203-205, 230 (suggesting that these 
contradictions and oppositions are “fundamental qualities of the self,” and 
“indeterminacy, consciousness, practicality, and objectivity” are intertwined). 
 100. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 264-96 (tracing various 
interpretations of the role of adjudication in applying social theory). 
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accomplished, though, by simply noting the legitimating role this 
dimension of law can usefully play.  
As such, interpretationist discourse, to the extent it principally 
draws on these texts, heavily relies on the legal ideology of the 
communities where they are produced.101 Absent a similar context of 
legitimation, local implementation of such theories does not 
guarantee any significant discursive or operational effect. Quite 
likely, the new interpretation will run the same negative fate as 
perceived of law generally in the region. It will look equally deficient 
in application under the withering gaze habitually cast on law in 
Latin America.  
Indeed, critiques of legal formalism could surface against the new 
interpretation. The development objection to conventional Latin 
American practice condemns the prominence of foreign legal sources 
and the resulting gap vis-à-vis local societies. Their outward 
foreignness buttresses the critique of a legal formalism disconnected 
from social reality. This perceived problem might be no more 
remedied through the “new interpretation.” To maintain the 
appearance of legitimacy and law-like nature, it is not unlikely that 
interpretationists may turn to ever more disconnected presentations 
of transnational theory and methods. Similar to the role played by 
European legal sources, the purpose would be to present legal 
authority separate and distinct from local politics. This mode of 
legitimizing new practices would invite other rounds of critique, 
asserting the new interpretation’s own legal formalism and 
inappropriately transplanted nature. 
The new interpretation already shares many of the same 
characteristics of traditional legal doctrine in the region, albeit with 
 
 101. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 1 (1980); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF 
LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86-87 (2004) (determining that rule of law 
“does not produce a single right answer,” and this indeterminacy theory allows 
judges to make decisions based on information other than legal principles); 
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory 
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (2001) (debating how legislation 
can be interpreted both narrowly and broadly, and legal theory requires 
interpretation from these types of “extrinsic sources”); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom 
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
518, 518 (1986) (assessing conflicts of law and the proper outcomes in cases as the 
types of questions legal reasoning must answer). 
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different sources. Whereas continental European authorities were the 
primary materials before now, it is rather more adjudication-focused 
Anglo-American jurists that are prominent. Not unlike European 
transnationalism, though, it is not uncommon for a Latin American 
scholar to become identified with a particularly well-known theorist 
and become his/her local champion within local debates. There is 
room for any number of misreadings and localized renditions of the 
foreign scholar.102 Local exponents of foreign authors may indeed 
advance, reject, or re-combine different legal and theoretical 
proposals. In this way, the new interpretation fits within the mold of 
European transnationalism, although with more Anglo-American 
sources. 
D. LOSING LEGAL CAPITAL 
Generally, legal and institutional reform under the umbrella of 
development transnationalism undermines a significant amount of 
existing legal capital, or acquis légaux.103 Worthwhile legal policies 
and institutional forms may be easily, if not automatically, rejected 
through this formula. A wholesale switch to different processes with 
different discursive landmarks and constraints adds significant costs. 
However, without a clear definition of the policy changes and 
distributional consequences sought, a different legal institutional 
model may not fare any better. Indeed, as a result of the limitations 
of liberal law, the same failures will likely re-appear. It is not 
possible here to discuss the array of legal capital existing within legal 
systems in Latin America. Briefly, though, they consist in part of the 
accumulated social investment in law and legal institutions over 
time, such as training the legal profession in certain modes of 
procedure and discourses of argumentation. Additionally, they also 
can include particular political positions or policy combinations 
enshrined in law that, as a result of the development formula for 
reform, are never openly considered as real alternatives.  
 
 102. See Duncan Kennedy, Prólogo [Preface] to MEDINA, supra note 12, at xi, 
xiii (discussing the author’s novel explanation of the canons of legal reasoning 
theory in its multiple interpretations within the local context of readers that choose 
to read and interpret the texts with their own “creative” needs in mind). 
 103. See Esquirol, supra note 26, at 77 (explaining that the failure of legal 
reform occurs because these reforms “purport to redress . . . a combination of 
features endogenous to all systems of law, problems projected on the region as a 
whole, and assessments contingent on political and organizational preferences”). 
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It may be that an existing policy mix, set in law in any one case, 
can be counter-productive to economic development, but then again 
its development-oriented reform may simply be more beneficial to 
those effectively mobilizing a “development” argument. For 
example, the position to reduce pro-labor legislation in Latin 
American countries draws heavily on the characterization of general 
legal failure in the labor regime. Specifically cited are the lack of 
enforcement, limited coverage, and cooptation of unions by 
government, or in other words, lawlessness, the gap between law on 
the books and law in action, and official corruption. Discrediting 
national law assists in making the case for reforms. More concretely, 
however, real questions of policy are in play over job security, 
workers’ rights, medical benefits, and the like. The sum of such 
reforms will shape the national political economy. Much of this 
discussion and debate, however, is waged only indirectly. It is 
obscured by the logic of development. Rather than confront the 
stakes more directly, attention is directed to rectify purportedly 
broken legal systems when policy changes and distributional re-
allocations are the real issues at stake.  
Another example is the mix of defendants’ rights and state 
enforcement powers in the areas of criminal procedure. The detailed 
question of specific rights at different stages of the proceedings and 
the appropriate mix in particular countries take a back seat to the 
juggernaut of transforming procedure from the traditional 
inquisitorial to the development adversarial. This example 
particularly highlights the impact of the widely reviled “inquisitorial” 
model linked to Latin America, branded the cause of evils ranging 
from human rights abuses to non-enforcement, impunity, secrecy, 
corruption, and undemocratic behavior. However, the mere 
substitution of adversarial for inquisitorial obscures the policy 
questions that re-calibrating criminal procedure entails. More orality 
of instruction and shifting discretion from the judge to the public 
prosecutor will not eliminate the intrinsic tensions between political 
independence and official accountability, defendant rights versus 
state enforcement powers, and positive law and social behavior.  
In the context of interpretationism, the legal capital at risk is the 
status of law and legal reasoning. Despite the accumulated charges of 
failure and formalism, the legal dogmatics of the region retains its 
law-like quality, at least as compared to proposals framed as anti-
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formalism commonly championed by interpretationists. Indeed, the 
danger of anti-formalism is that it could cease to be recognized as 
law.104 Approached as merely a technical enterprise, the new 
interpretation would solely introduce new variables or techniques. 
However, with no clear set of constraints on such new variables, its 
skeptics assert that legal reasoning could simply become pure 
discretion.105 Dressed up as principles or policies, for example, legal 
decision-makers could make the law say whatever they decided. The 
trick is to invest the principles or policies with enough meaning, or 
limitation of meaning, to provide some constraint against just any 
outcome. It is not clear that the adoption of any one proposal for 
greater pragmatism or context could withstand charges of 
instrumentalism. No single anti-formal device can defend against 
such critiques unless it stands side-by-side with a normalizing 
discourse, produced by a critical mass of faithful supporters insisting 
on its legitimacy and practicability.  
As a result, the all-purpose diagnosis of Latin American failure 
can be turned against new constitutional and other legal 
constructions by opponents claiming these too are instances of a 
failed law, if not for their excessive formalism then for their 
unconstrained arbitrariness. The stage is set for subsequent rounds of 
challenges and critiques in this same way, available to political 
antagonists who can automatically and without much specificity 
claim the misapplication and manipulation of these new methods. 
Any such deformation is especially easy to link to their Latin 
American application, intoning the well-consolidated diagnosis of 
law’s failure in these countries. At the same time, this picture 
downplays the general shortcomings of interpretation everywhere 
and the accompanying body of ideological legitimation that 
 
 104. The first phase of law and development has been generally described as 
shipwrecking on this very point. See James Gardiner, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: 
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1981); see also 
Miller, supra note 90, at 94-95, 155 (describing the de-legitimating impact on the 
Argentine Supreme Court of interpretive methods based on mere “charismatic” 
assertions). 
105.  See Ronaldo Porto Macedo, Jr., Interpretation of Good Faith in Brazilian 
Contracts: The Legal Principles in a Relational Approach (2010) (presented at the 
XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy for Comparative 
Law, Washington, D.C., July 2010) (on file with American University 
International Law Review).  
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successful practices require. Indeed, supporting the current wave of 
neo-constitutionalism has meant suppressing the knowledge that the 
right methods, to the extent that the instrumental belief guides 
participants in legal interpretation debates, are not a technical but a 
political question. Moreover, it has meant adopting the framework of 
Latin American legal failure as a convenient springboard for 
supporting substantive legal changes. 
E. DEEPENING LEGAL FAILURE 
The new interpretation may simply reinforce the background 
paradigm of failure and undermine the normalization of legal 
governance that most of its exponents desire. The field outwardly 
rests on the assumption that the right mix of interpretive methods can 
exist, and it is projected as operating effectively in the global North. 
However, this framing misperceives an important facet of 
interpretation discourse, either unconsciously or instrumentally. This 
dimension of law is not simply about achieving any particular 
interpretive technique. Rather it is a broad commitment to the 
deployment of interpretive discourse to legitimate judicial 
lawmaking and legal reasoning. It operates through the instrumental 
fiction of correct methods of interpretation and correct applications 
of method, consisting in debate, ultimate adoption, and subsequent 
revision of the correct meaning. However, retaining the optic of 
hyper-realist critique trained onto Latin America, a feature of the 
legal failure diagnosis, any interpretation locally is subject not only 
to critiques of incorrectness in method and application but also to 
constant charges of deformation and manipulation. It turns out to be 
a quite precarious mode of defending outcomes based on legal 
reasoning, assuming that is one’s purpose of course. 
In this light, the new interpretation can be seen as premised on a 
skewed representation of conventional Latin American practice, as 
well as transnational theories of interpretation. The transnational 
theories enjoy a wide degree of legitimacy from their home 
ideological contexts and as prestigious transnational theory.106 The 
Latin American practice is continually discredited as a legal failure. 
As such, this framework sustains an image of a successful 
reconstructive practice of liberal law in the global North contrasted 
 
 106. Flores, supra note 2. 
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against its continually failed version in Latin America. It draws from 
and simultaneously reinforces the paradigm of the West’s success 
and Latin America’s failure.  
The continual re-instantiation and normalization of this image 
undermines the credibility of national systems in Latin America. 
Additionally, the non-recognition of the various ways in which 
existing modes of legal reasoning already incorporate some of the 
elements purportedly found missing relegates Latin American 
interpretive practices to perpetual discredit. It also appears to 
disassociate public and academic discourse from the function of 
legitimation of much actual legal practice in Latin America.107 
Transnational alternatives become overly idealized as actually 
capable of producing uncontroversial operational results. Thus, while 
theories of legal interpretation are defended as appropriate decision-
making, the practice of legal interpretation in Latin America may be 
serially de-legitimized.  
Troublingly, as a significant dynamic for legal change, the failure 
trope seriously debilitates and undermines law as a social system. 
Pursuing reform in this way is counter-productive. First, it 
undermines the legal system unduly by continually denigrating it 
systematically for the mere purpose of ushering in legal reform. 
These reforms are equally liberal legal forms subject to the same 
failings previously diagnosed. Second, it occludes potential 
alternatives and values in pre-reform law not openly evaluated, as 
well as other options different than interpretationist discourse 
practiced in the current way. In short, reconstructive interventions in 
liberal law, as practiced in the global North, cannot redress the 
shortcomings of law perceived in Latin America. Rather than merely 
rebutting legal realism, interpretationists must re-construct against a 
crushing background of systemic legal failure. This idea goes well 
beyond proposals for more neutral principles analysis, policy 
balancing, or legal process. Instead, it requires confronting the 
 
 107. For scholarship drawing attention to actual local practices of interpretation, 
see generally Jorge González Jácome, El Problema de las Fuentes del Derecho: 
Una Perspectiva desde la Argumentación Jurídica [The Problem of the Sources of 
Law: A Legal Reasoning Perspective], 112 VNIVERSITAS 265 (2006) (Colom.) 
(discussing how Colombian judges choose legal modes to legitimate their rulings 
based on the legal environment, rather than basing their decisions on one doctrine 
or source of law). 
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diagnosis of failure, making fair comparisons, and having realistic 
expectations of liberal law and legal systems. 
CONCLUSION 
The limitations of legal interpretation are too difficult to deny in 
Latin America. Some may see this as proof of the reality of liberal 
law’s failure in the region. Yet, perhaps it is also due to the lack of a 
sufficiently vast and disciplining liberal legal ideology exerting 
dominance. The new interpretation appears as a positive 
development. It has invigorated the scholarly community and the 
public to engage questions of legal governance. It incorporates new 
sources within the traditional scheme of continental European 
authorities. It also focuses on new questions, principally operational 
methods and approaches.  
However, the new interpretation may also be unwittingly 
reproducing a narrative of perpetual Latin American legal failure. It 
is premised on the common diagnosis of failed Latin American legal 
practices and, by contrast, successful first world transplants and best 
practices as models for reform. This construct significantly 
misrepresents actual practice both in Latin America and elsewhere. 
As a result, all models can fail in the region. Indeed, the new 
interpretation sustains a hyper-realist critique of Latin American 
legal practices, further undermining legality at home while only 
reinforcing its reconstructive possibilities elsewhere. 
One could imaginably evaluate the pros and cons of this new 
discursive framework as currently practiced. One could weigh, for 
example, the benefits it offers progressive constitutionalism versus 
its general erosion of Latin American legality. Of course, this 
measurement is not really possible. Outcomes are too hard to predict, 
we would likely get it wrong, and other problems of the sort. 
However, considering this is not the only possible framework for 
debating reform in Latin America, the particular down sides noted 
here may not be a necessary part of the mix.  
It may be possible to dislodge legal interpretation discourse from 
its framing within the narrative of Latin American legal failure. For 
example, infusing discussions with more transparently critical 
versions of legal theory could serve to de-mystify the operation of 
interpretive debates in the global North. This would possibly 
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transform the current paradigm in Latin America, which could 
potentially take very different tracks. Faith in liberal legalism 
everywhere could wane, and participants in legal interpretation 
debates in Latin America could lose interest in these topics. Or, 
possibly, the relative faithlessness everywhere would generate a 
more horizontal perspective of different national versions of legal 
liberalism and maintain the utility of the discourse itself, 
emphasizing the nuances of local practices. On all of these fronts, 
however, much further work remains. 
